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1. This note will focus primarily on hostile workplace sexual harassment claims brought under
federal anti-discrimination laws, most notably Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and will not deal
with quid pro quo sexual harassment.  All cases examined will consider the equal opportunity harasser
defense in the context of hostile work environment claims.  The use of the defense in other areas and in state
discrimination cases is beyond the scope of this note.
2. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
3. In order to bring a successful sexual harassment claim against an employer under Title VII, a
plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of a prima facie case, which are as follows:
1. The plaintiff must be in a protected class;
2. The plaintiff must be subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment;
3. The harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms, conditions, or
privileges of the plaintiff’s employment;
4. The harassment must be because of sex (this requirement will be the major focus of this note);
5. The doctrine of respondeat superior must apply.
See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986).
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following three workplace scenarios.1
Alice, a female employee at ABC corporation, has been subjected to
almost continuous harassment by her immediate supervisor, Bob, for the past
two months.  Several times each week, Bob makes crude and sexually
suggestive comments and, on numerous occasions, Bob has touched Alice
inappropriately in the workplace.  Assuming Alice attempts to remedy this
situation in a reasonable time period and her employer has unreasonably failed
“to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,”2 Alice will
most likely be able to bring a hostile workplace sex discrimination claim
against her employer for Bob’s sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.3
Andrew, a male employee at XYZ Corporation, has been subjected to
almost continuous harassment by his immediate supervisor, Ben, for the past
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4. Same-sex sexual harassment was held to be actionable under Title VII by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).  Assuming Andrew, like Alice
in the first hypothetical, satisfies the prima facie requirements, his claim is viable under Title VII despite
the fact that he (the victim) and Ben (the harasser) are of the same sex.
5. See, e.g., Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001); Holman v. Indiana, 211
F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 880; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.
1982).
6. See Shylah Miles, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Defense:  Eliminating the Equal-Opportunity-
Harasser Defense, 76 WASH. L. REV. 603, 614 (2001).
two months.  Several times each week, Ben makes crude and sexually
suggestive comments and, on numerous occasions, Ben has touched Andrew
inappropriately in the workplace.  Assuming Andrew attempts to remedy this
situation in a reasonable time period and his employer has unreasonably failed
“to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,” Andrew
will most likely be able to bring a hostile workplace sex discrimination claim
against his employer for Ben’s sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.4
Alice and Andrew, a female and male employee, respectively, of a large
corporation have both been subjected to almost continuous harassment by
their immediate supervisor, Barry, for the past two months.  Several times
each week, Barry, when alone with Alice, makes crude and sexually
suggestive comments and, on numerous occasions, Barry has touched Alice
inappropriately in the workplace.  Moreover, several times each week, Barry,
when alone with Andrew, makes crude and sexually suggestive comments and,
on numerous occasions, Barry has touched Andrew inappropriately in the
workplace as well.  Assuming both Andrew and Alice attempt to remedy their
respective situations in a reasonable time period and their employer has
unreasonably failed “to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior,” in certain federal courts5 neither Andrew nor Alice, whether filing
separately or jointly, will be able to bring a hostile workplace sex
discrimination claim against their employer for Barry’s sexual harassment
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Though the above three hypothetical scenarios all appear to be the same
(both in terms of actionable wrongs as well as identical wording), the legal
result in the last situation involving Andrew and Alice, in many federal courts,
would differ dramatically from the legal result that would arise in the first two
hypothetical scenarios as a result of the acceptance of the equal opportunity
harasser defense by certain federal courts of appeal.  Under the equal
opportunity harasser defense, a defendant attempts to illustrate that the alleged
harasser harassed both men and women alike,6 and as such, a sexual
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7. Id. at 614.
8. See, e.g., Lack, 240 F.3d 255; Holman, 211 F.3d 399; Henson, 682 F.2d 897.
9. Miles, supra note 6, at 606.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
harassment victim is unable to satisfy the “because of sex” prima facie case
requirement.7  In those federal courts of appeal that accept the equal
opportunity harasser defense,8 Andrew and Alice (from scenario number
three) would both be victims of their supervisor’s sexual harassment;
however, both would be left without a remedy under Title VII due to the
unfortunate circumstance that their supervisor, Barry, targeted both men and
women as victims of his sexual harassment.  When the equal opportunity
harasser defense is accepted, the “because of sex” requirement “is impossible
to satisfy, leaving plaintiffs without protection under sexual harassment law.”9
Because Title VII is meant to prevent an employer from discriminating against
an individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin,”10 leaving victims of sexual harassment without a remedy and
wrongdoers unpunished appears to frustrate the goals of the statute and leads
to an absurd result due to the mere fact that the perpetrator sexually harasses
a member or members of both sexes.
How can federal courts avoid such unfortunate and antithetical results,
provide victims of sexual harassment a remedy, as well as respect the goals
and purposes underlying Title VII’s prohibitions against sex discrimination?
In order to eliminate federal reliance on the equal opportunity harasser
defense in Title VII hostile work environment sexual harassment claims, the
U.S. Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court must articulate a broader definition
of “sex” (as it applies to Title VII sexual harassment actions) and/or adopt a
mode of individual analysis, which analyzes claims of sexual harassment
individually instead of analyzing sexual harassment claims as they relate to
other individuals who have also brought a similar claim against the same
employer.
Part I of this note analyzes the circumstances surrounding the passage of
Title VII and the purposes behind such federal legislation.  This section will
focus primarily on the underlying and evolving purposes and goals of federal
anti-discrimination law, in general, and sexual harassment law, in particular.
This section also will argue and conclude that the purposes and goals of Title
VII oppose the acceptance of the equal opportunity harasser defense in sex
discrimination claims.  Part II analyzes the cases in which several federal
courts have accepted the equal opportunity harasser defense to sexual
harassment claims.  This section will pay close attention to the legal and
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11. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (embracing same-sex
sexual harassment); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (embracing hostile workplace sexual
harassment claims).
12. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (challenging the pay of female
prison guards as compared to male prison guards).
statutory arguments that courts rely upon to justify acceptance of this
controversial shield to liability.  Part III explores the several courts that have
either rejected the equal opportunity harasser defense or held it to not be a per
se bar to all claims of sexual harassment.  This section will focus primarily on
the arguments that are made and the modes of analysis that are utilized to find
liability despite the existence of an individual who sexually harasses both men
and women.  Part IV argues and concludes that Title VII sexual harassment
law should adopt an individualized mode of analysis as opposed to its current
approach.  Under this suggested method, the treatment and harassment of each
victim would be analyzed in isolation without considering the sexual
harassment claims of other individuals in the same workplace to determine if
the plaintiff has satisfied the “because of sex” prima facie case requirement.
This approach will best serve the underlying purposes and goals of Title VII’s
prohibition against sexual harassment and provide victims who would
otherwise be left unprotected with a remedy.  Finally, Part V will argue that,
even if an individualized mode of analysis is rejected by federal courts, the
U.S. Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court should redefine the meaning of
“sex” in sexual harassment law in order to eliminate reliance on the equal
opportunity harasser defense.  By adopting a more expansive definition of
“sex” as it applies in the sexual harassment context, the Congress or the Court
will best further the aims of Title VII and eliminate the use of the equal
opportunity harasser defense.
I.  THE EVOLVING PURPOSES OF TITLE VII
Undoubtedly, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
for the primary purpose of eradicating both the past and continuing practices
of racial discrimination in a variety of employment contexts.  However, over
time, Title VII has embraced a variety of employment practices not originally
envisioned by its framers, most notably in the area of sexual harassment law.11
Initially, Title VII was used as a vehicle to eradicate sex-based compensation
schemes,12 but as an evolving piece of legislation, Title VII was used to
remove other forms of sex discrimination from the workplace, including quid
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13. See generally Meritor, 477 U.S. 57.
14.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. . . .
15. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
16. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
17. Id. at 79.
18. Miles, supra note 6, at 603 (quoting Hon. Stephen Reinhardt, Foreword to BARBARA T.
LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, at xix (1992)).
19. See Meritor, 477 U.S. 57.
20. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
21. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775 (1998).
pro quo and hostile workplace sexual harassment.13  While the wording of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) appears to be limited to tangible and, primarily
economic, elements,14 the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded on Title VII’s
scope of protection by emphasizing that Title VII is meant “to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women.”15
While the eradication of racial discrimination was the primary goal of
Title VII, the statute has adapted to deal with issues not originally considered
by the legislators who enacted it into law.  In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.,16 the U.S. Supreme Court, in holding that same-sex sexual
harassment claims are actionable under Title VII, stated, “statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”17  Title VII
was not passed for the primary purpose of eliminating sexual harassment in
the workplace, or more specifically, to eliminate equal opportunity harassers
from the work environment, but nevertheless, Title VII must adapt to modern
employment situations, as the Court acknowledged that it must in Oncale.  As
one commentator has emphasized, “[w]e must be aware that whatever rules we
develop will require constant reexamination, modification, and fine-tuning.
The sexual, gender, and preference revolutions are not over.  Society is in a
constant state of evolution.”18  Title VII has adapted over the past two decades
to deal with the unique, and sometimes unforeseeable, problems associated
with sexual harassment law, such as hostile work environment sexual
harassment claims,19 same-sex sexual harassment,20 and the liability of
employers for the conduct of their supervisors.21  The equal opportunity
harasser defense presents yet another one of those unforeseeable problems.
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22. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
23. Id. at 453-54 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 454 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978)).
25. See Miles, supra note 6, at 631 (“Equal-opportunity harassment creates the same hostile work
environment and inequalities that traditional harassment does and thus should be prohibited by sexual
harassment laws.”).
The equal opportunity harasser defense is a relatively recent phenomenon that
must be dealt with before its disastrous implications affect numerous victims
of sexual harassment.  As businesses and their attorneys become more
sophisticated and attempt to avoid liability under Title VII, the law must keep
pace in order that the goals of anti-discrimination legislation are not frustrated.
Aside from the fact that Title VII and its prohibitions against sexual
harassment must adapt to modern employment problems, such as the equal
opportunity harasser, Title VII is legislation, under a disparate treatment
analysis, that seeks to provide individuals with protection from discrimination
and a remedy against those who violate its dictates.  In Connecticut v. Teal,22
the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court emphatically stated on several
occasions that Title VII protects individuals.  The Court wrote, “[t]he
principal focus of the statute [Title VII] is the protection of the individual
employee . . . . [T]he entire statute and its legislative history are replete with
references to protection for the individual employee.”23  If Title VII is meant
to protect individuals from acts of discrimination, the equally inappropriate
treatment of other individuals should not bar otherwise actionable claims.  For
example, if a supervisor referred to all black employees as “niggers” but also
referred to all Asian employees as “gooks,” would we, as a society, allow the
employer to escape liability for the supervisor’s discrimination?  If society is
disgusted at these actions, then why do we accept the equal opportunity
harasser defense?
The Teal Court further stated, “[a] racially balanced work force cannot
immunize an employer from liability for specific acts of discrimination.”24  In
essence, all male and female employees in an office may be “balanced” based
on the fact that all are subjected to an equal opportunity harasser, yet this
“equal” treatment should not protect an employer from the specific acts of
individual sexual harassment.25  While the Teal decision dealt with a disparate
impact claim (and not a disparate treatment claim of sexual harassment), it
would seem antithetical to Title VII’s overall goals to prevent an individual
(i.e., a female employee) from bringing a claim merely because the group as
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26. See Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recognizing Sexual
Harassment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 383, 407 (1996)
There is no denying the fact that the victims of an attack by a bisexual are no better off than victims
of a heterosexual or homosexual attack.  It is only because courts are locked into the traditional
analysis requiring that in order for a harasser to be liable, he must have selected only one gender as
the target that a bisexual/equal opportunity harasser’s acts are not prohibited under Title VII.
Id.
27. Miles, supra note 6, at 629.
28. Id. at 630.
29. Id.
30. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
a whole (i.e., the entire office of male and female employees) is treated
equally poorly.26
Title VII’s goal of eliminating discrimination, in general, and sexual
harassment, in particular, is frustrated by acceptance of the equal opportunity
harasser defense in two additional ways.  First, by allowing the equal
opportunity harasser defense to shield liability, an entire group of sexual
harassment victims is left without any federal protection or remedy.27  If, for
example, a female plaintiff, pleading the same facts, was the sole victim of the
harasser’s conduct, Title VII would offer her protection; however, merely
because the harasser subjected a male employee to similar conduct, both are
left without protection.  Title VII was meant to serve as a vehicle to eliminate
discrimination and provide victims with a remedy, not to serve as a means to
allow discrimination to flourish without a response.  Second, while all sexual
harassment is deplorable, an equal opportunity harasser could be considered
worse than a traditional harasser because the former treats everyone horribly.28
In essence, courts that accept the equal opportunity harasser defense are
telling individuals that the “more people one harasses, the less susceptible one
is to prosecution.”29  Considering the effects and consequences of the equal
opportunity harasser defense, it is difficult to argue that it is consistent with
the goals and purposes underlying the passage of Title VII.  While Title VII
intended to eliminate discriminatory behavior from the workplace, the equal
opportunity harasser defense allows it to continue unabated.
II.  ACCEPTANCE OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSER DEFENSE
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,30 Justice Ginsburg, in concurrence,
stated the following:  “[T]he critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
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31. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
32. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
33. Id.
34. 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000).
35. Id. at 400-01.
36. Id. at 403.
37. Id. at 404 (emphasis removed).
38. Id. at 403.
exposed.”31  This statement was cited with approval by Justice Scalia in his
majority opinion in Oncale.32  Moreover, in the same opinion, the Court stated
that Title VII does not deal with all harassment in the workplace but only with
sexual harassment that can be characterized as “discriminat[ion] . . . because
of . . . sex.”33  While the U.S. Supreme Court has never dealt with or ruled on
the viability of the equal opportunity harasser defense, several courts have
read the language in the Harris and Oncale decisions as tacit approval of the
equal opportunity harasser defense as a means to avoid liability under Title
VII.
In Holman v. Indiana,34 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the claim for failure to state a cause of action because the
plaintiffs, a husband and wife, alleged that their male supervisor had sexually
harassed both of them on separate occasions.35  The circuit court emphasized
that:
[B]ecause Title VII is premised on eliminating discrimination, inappropriate conduct that
is inflicted on both sexes, or is inflicted regardless of sex, is outside the statute’s ambit.
Title VII does not cover the “equal opportunity” or “bisexual” harasser, then, because
such a person is not discriminating on the basis of sex.  He is not treating one sex better
(or worse) than the other; he is treating both sexes the same (albeit badly).36
The circuit court further emphasized that Title VII was meant to eliminate
discrimination and stated, “[g]iven this premise, requiring disparate treatment
is consistent with the statute’s purpose of preventing such treatment.”37  Since
both Karen and Steven Holman were subjected to the same treatment and
harassment, neither one could bring a sex discrimination claim under Title VII
because neither could prove disparate treatment or that the conduct was “on
the basis of sex.”38
The holding in Holman is consistent with the holdings of several other
circuits on the issue of the equal opportunity harasser defense.  According to
the Seventh Circuit, “Harassment that is inflicted without regard to gender,
that is, where males and females in the same setting do not receive disparate
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39. Pasqua v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Shepherd v. Slater
Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1011 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e readily acknowledge that the factfinder could infer
from such evidence that Jemison’s harassment was bisexual and therefore beyond the reach of Title VII
. . . .”).
40. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
41. 43 F. App’x 800 (6th Cir. 2002).
42. Id. at 804.
43. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
44. Id. at 620.
45. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2000).
46. Id. at 404.
47. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
treatment, is not actionable because the harassment is not based on sex.”39  In
a case involving an equal opportunity harasser, the Eleventh Circuit held:
[T]here may be cases in which a supervisor makes sexual overtures to workers of both
sexes or where the conduct complained of is equally offensive to male and female
workers.  In such cases, the sexual harassment would not be based on sex because men
and women are accorded like treatment.  Although the plaintiff might have a remedy
under state law in such a situation, the plaintiff would have no remedy under Title VII.40
In the case of Walker v. National Revenue Corp.,41 in dismissing a claim of
sexual harassment by a male employee, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the
plaintiff not only failed to present evidence that the conduct in question was
because of sex, but the plaintiff presented evidence that the alleged harasser
“treated every employee badly, male and female alike.”42  In Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co.,43 the Sixth Circuit, following the precedents in other
circuits, declared, “Instances of complained of sexual conduct that prove
equally offensive to male and female workers would not support a Title VII
sexual harassment charge because both men and women were accorded like
treatment.”44  In these circuits, the equal opportunity harasser defense is a
shield to liability for claims of sexual harassment under Title VII.
The federal courts that accept the equal opportunity harasser defense have
emphasized that Title VII is meant to prevent and eliminate discrimination,45
and in the absence of disparate treatment between men and women (which
essentially is lacking in cases dealing with equal opportunity harassers), there
is no discrimination for Title VII to remedy.  Specifically, the court in Holman
emphasized that, unless there is disparate treatment and harassment “because
of sex,” Title VII would turn into a general civility code,46 which the Supreme
Court has explicitly stated Title VII was not intended to be.47
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the applicability of the
equal opportunity harasser defense in Title VII actions, one commentator in
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48. Id. at 80-81.
49. See David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex?  The Causation Problem in Sexual
Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1739-40 (2002).
50. Id. at 1742; see also Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“The numerous depositions of Showboat employees reveal that Trenkle was indeed abusive to men, but
that his abuse of women was different.  It relied on sexual epithets, offensive, explicit references to women’s
bodies and sexual conduct.”).
51. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I concur because the Court stresses that in
every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII’s statutory requirement
that there be discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”).
52. 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993).
53. Id. at 1335.
54. Id. at 1336.
55. See supra Part II.
particular believes that, based on the Court’s holding in Oncale and its
emphasis on comparative evidence,48 it would hold that the equal opportunity
harasser defense does not violate Title VII.49  However, on the contrary, it
could also be argued that the use of comparative evidence may help in
defeating the equal opportunity harasser defense.  For example, the use of
comparative evidence may illustrate that, while the supervisor sexually
harassed both men and women, he treated women worse.50  Though the
commentator’s opinion is mere speculation, the Court’s emphasis in Oncale
that the plaintiff prove discrimination “because of sex”51 may illustrate its
tendency to rule in favor of the equal opportunity harasser defense.  In the end,
this question will only be decided when the Supreme Court grants certiorari
to a case to decide the applicability of the equal opportunity harasser defense
in Title VII sexual harassment cases.
III.  JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
HARASSER DEFENSE
One of the most prominent cases to reject the equal opportunity harasser
defense is Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp.52  Similar to the Holman case,
the plaintiffs, who included a husband and wife, were subjected to sexually
harassing conduct by their male supervisor.53  In order to avoid liability, the
defendant asserted that Bell, the harassing supervisor, harassed both men and
women alike, and as such, he was an equal opportunity harasser and did not
discriminate because of sex.54  Though many federal courts have accepted this
defense,55 the Wyoming District Court rejected the defense for several
reasons.  The district court first ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court in Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson “moved away from a disparate treatment or ‘but
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56. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1336; see also Miles, supra note 6, at 619-20 (“In other words, the
[Chiapuzio] court chose to focus on the ‘un-welcome’ and ‘severe and pervasive’ elements of the sexual
harassment test with the belief that these elements would make up for any ambiguity as to the question of
‘but for one’s sex.’”).
57. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting John J. Donahue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment
Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1610-11 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS:  THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992)).
61. Id. at 1338.
62. 257 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2001).
63. Id. at 256.
64. Id. at 254.
65. 240 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001).
for’ analysis of gender harassment” and embraced the position that sexual
harassment “occurs when unwelcome physical or verbal conduct creates a
hostile work environment.”56  Moreover, the district court then illustrated the
strange results that would occur by accepting the equal opportunity harasser
defense.57  The court emphasized that it seemed unlikely that Title VII protects
an individual from unwelcome heterosexual or homosexual advances in the
workplace but leaves the same individual unprotected when dealing with
unwelcome bisexual advances.58  Based on its understanding of Title VII, the
court emphasized that an equal opportunity harasser is not immune from
liability.59  In rejecting the equal opportunity harasser defense, the court stated
that even if an individual is an equal opportunity harasser, “it is not
unthinkable to argue that each individual who is harassed is being treated
badly because of gender.”60  Using this as its basis, the court held that, looking
at the supervisor’s behavior, he harassed each individual plaintiff because of
sex and the behavior was actionable under Title VII.61
The Second Circuit in Brown v. Henderson62 emphasized that there is “no
per se bar to maintaining a claim of sex discrimination where a person of
another sex has been similarly treated.”63  The Brown court further stated,
“[T]he inquiry into whether ill treatment was actually sex-based
discrimination cannot be short-circuited by the mere fact that both men and
women are involved.”64  Though the court did not find liability in this specific
case, the Second Circuit may be willing to find liability in a case even if the
harasser was an equal opportunity harasser.  While somewhat more
ambiguous, the Fourth Circuit decision in Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.65
illustrated that evidence of an equal opportunity harasser may not preclude an
individual plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim.  The circuit court emphasized,
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66. Id. at 262 (citation omitted).
67. 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
68. Id. at 1462.
69. Id. at 1464.
70. Id.
71. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000).
72. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996) (“It would be exceedingly perverse
if a male worker could buy his supervisors and his company immunity from Title VII liability by taking care
to harass sexually an occasional male worker, though his preferred targets were female.”).
“[w]hile the female employees’ complaints do not, as a matter of law,
preclude Lack’s [a male] claim, they do present an imposing obstacle to
proving that the harassment was sex-based.”66  While the Fourth Circuit would
not immediately preclude Title VII relief to a victim of an equal opportunity
harasser, it does, however, view evidence of an equal opportunity harasser as
a significant burden a plaintiff must overcome to satisfy the statute’s
requirements and to impute liability to the employer.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the use of the equal opportunity harasser
defense in the case of Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.67  In that case, the
supervisor in question sexually harassed both male and female employees,
though his harassment was more vulgar and explicit toward the female
employees.68  Nevertheless, the court emphasized that even if the supervisor’s
sexual harassment of male employees was equal to the sexual harassment of
the female employees, the supervisor cannot use his harassment of men to
“cure” his harassment of women in the workplace.69  Moreover, while the
court was deciding the individual case of Steiner, it clarified its rejection of
the equal opportunity harasser defense by stating that both men and women
working at Showboat could have viable sexual harassment claims under Title
VII against the equal opportunity harasser.70
Though the Holman court accepted the equal opportunity harasser
defense, it mentioned and quickly disregarded the argument that acceptance
of the equal opportunity harasser defense would, in essence, encourage
harassers to “manufacture a second harassment of a different sex so they could
insulate themselves from Title VII liability.”71  This policy-based argument
was also furthered, and rejected, in another case from the Seventh Circuit.72
Though the fabrication of additional sexual harassment claims may, at first
glance, seem like a preposterous notion, it is an argument that deserves some
careful consideration before being so quickly dismissed.  The relief available
to a plaintiff under Title VII, prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, provided little incentive for employers to modify their behavior;
however, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a plaintiff may be
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74. See generally Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000).
76. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(A).
77. While an employer may avoid federal civil liability under Title VII via the equal opportunity
harasser defense, the employer (or supervisor) could potentially face civil and potentially criminal liability
under state substantive law, in particular tort law.
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entitled to both compensatory and punitive damages in disparate treatment
cases, including claims of sexual harassment.73  Though a plaintiff must prove
vicarious liability74 and the compensatory and punitive damages are subject
to statutory limits,75 the possibility of paying damages may provide an
employer, especially a smaller one, with the incentive to fabricate additional
sexual harassment claims to take advantage of the equal opportunity harasser
defense.  For example, an employer with more than 14 employees but less
than 100 could face punitive damages up to $50,000.76  While this amount of
money may be insignificant to a large corporation, the possibility of paying
large amounts of punitive damages could potentially cripple a small- to
medium-size company.  Faced with the danger of heavy financial losses
associated with sexual harassment litigation and liability, an employer may
manufacture additional cases of sexual harassment to take advantage of the
shield offered by the equal opportunity harasser defense.77  Though it could
be argued that neither an ethical attorney nor an employer would encourage
additional cases of sexual harassment since such actions could lead to lawsuits
grounded in state tort law, a desperate employer could find willing co-
employees, who will manufacture claims as well as guarantee they will not
bring additional causes of action (e.g., lawsuits not based on Title VII) in
return for favorable treatment in other areas of the employer-employee
relationship (e.g., pay raises, promotions).  It is not the belief of the author that
this type of collusive behavior between employers and employees is
widespread,78 however, it is possible and must be addressed by courts
considering the equal opportunity harasser defense before accepting such a
controversial shield to sexual harassment liability.
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IV.  ADOPTION OF AN INDIVIDUALIZED ANAL YSIS
To fully effectuate the goals underlying Title VII and to eliminate sexual
harassment in the workplace, courts must adopt an individualized mode of
analysis in examining sexual harassment claims involving an equal
opportunity harasser.79  Though one court in particular has adopted such a
method of analysis in these types of cases,80 most courts refuse to look at each
individual claim of sexual harassment when there is evidence that the harasser
is an equal opportunity harasser.81  Moreover, while some courts have rejected
the equal opportunity harasser defense when there was evidence that one sex
was treated much worse than the other,82 thereby illustrating disparate
treatment, the more typical case involving an equal opportunity harasser
involves harassment of both sexes that is equally offensive without any
evidence that one sex in particular was targeted for the more severe and
inappropriate behavior.
Before delving into the specifics of this novel method of analysis for
cases involving equal opportunity harassers, it is critical to understand why
sexual harassment claims, in particular, should be analyzed under such an
individualized approach.  While sexual harassment usually involves the
harassment of an individual, the disparate treatment framework is a class-
based mode of analysis.83  Courts and commentators alike have suggested that
sexual harassment claims do not fit comfortably within the disparate treatment
framework developed for Title VII claims.84  Since sexual harassment claims
do not fit perfectly within this analytical scheme, the court in Chiapuzio
emphasized that some of the doctrines developed under disparate treatment
analysis, such as burden of proof and causation, would require some
adjustments in sexual harassment cases.85  As suggested by the Chiapuzio
court, in order to properly analyze claims of sexual harassment under Title
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VII, some doctrines must be modified, illustrating the need for an
individualized mode of analysis in certain cases, such as those involving an
equal opportunity harasser.
While a supervisor who is racist will most likely discriminate against all
members of the disfavored race, a supervisor is unlikely to sexually harass all
individuals who are members of one sex or another (or in the case of an equal
opportunity harasser, the supervisor will not sexually harass all individuals in
the workplace).  In instances of individual discrimination, such as cases of
sexual harassment, the harasser does not sexually harass all individuals in a
certain class (e.g., women) but harasses an individual based on his/her
inclusion in a class as well as the target’s individual characteristics, such as
physical appearance or personality.86  In essence, many victims of sexual
harassment are selected not solely as a result of their inclusion in a specified
class but because of their unique individual characteristics as well.  For
example, a woman may be targeted by a sexual harasser not only because she
is a woman but also due to the fact that she has blonde hair and blue eyes, two
individual characteristics that the harasser particularly enjoys.  As such, it
could be argued that women who do not meet the harasser’s “criteria” will not
be harassed.  Conversely, the same harasser may sexually harass a man in the
same office not only because he is a man but also based on the fact that he has
a muscular build, an individual feature of the victim that the harasser enjoys.
Since sexual harassment is primarily the result of the victim’s individual
characteristics, traditional disparate treatment analysis, which focuses
exclusively on an individual’s membership in a certain class, is inadequate,
and an individualized mode of analysis must be adopted to protect sexual
harassment victims and further the goals of Title VII.
Under traditional analysis, most courts use evidence of an equal
opportunity harasser as a means to bar a plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim;
however, under the suggested individual mode of analysis, each individual
plaintiff’s claim would be examined very closely to determine if sexual
harassment under Title VII has occurred.87  While the substantive law in
question would remain the same, the only major change that courts analyzing
sexual harassment claims would experience would be one of procedure.88
Courts may be more willing to adopt this approach since it is not a significant
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departure from traditional sexual harassment law, which would be the case in
adopting a new definition of “sex” for sexual harassment jurisprudence.89
Under an individual mode of analysis, a court, first and foremost, must
separate the individual claims of the plaintiffs (if there are multiple plaintiffs
or if there is evidence that another individual not a party to the lawsuit was
harassed as well).90  Second, when analyzing each individual claim, the court
must focus only on conduct that was targeted at the individual plaintiff
without considering the harasser’s conduct directed at other individuals.91  For
example, a court should consider evidence that a supervisor referred to a
female plaintiff as a “cunt” even if the same supervisor referred to a male
plaintiff as a “dick” or a “prick.”92  Finally, the plaintiff must present
sufficient evidence, including the three types of evidence outlined in Oncale,93
to show that the harassment in question was because of the plaintiff’s sex.94
In the previous example, since the use of the word “cunt” is a derogatory and
sex-specific term, the court could conclude that the supervisor’s harassment
toward this specific plaintiff was because of sex.95
As mentioned above, the Chiapuzio court was the first court to adopt the
suggested individualized mode of analysis to consider claims involving equal
opportunity harassers.96  The district court, instead of analyzing the plaintiffs
as a group, analyzed each plaintiff’s claim separately.97  The court looked at
the evidence as it pertained to each victim, and instead of determining whether
the harasser harassed only members of a certain sex, the court determined if
sex was a significant factor in each individual case of harassment.98  Based on
the evidence on the record, the court concluded that the individual plaintiffs
were harassed because of sex and each had a cause of action under Title VII.99
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Under the individual mode of analysis, the “because of sex” requirement is not
eliminated, yet the requirement is satisfied by considering the evidence for
each individual claim regardless of the existence of other victims of
harassment.100
To further illustrate the practicality and usefulness of the individualized
mode of analysis for cases dealing with equal opportunity harassers, this
approach will be applied to the third hypothetical included in Part I of this
discussion.101  Very briefly, two individuals, Alice and Andrew, are both being
sexually harassed by their supervisor, Barry.  To start, a court analyzing the
claims of Alice and Andrew should separate each complaint in order to
determine whether each one is actionable.  Second, the court must then
analyze each claim by looking at Barry’s conduct toward each individual
plaintiff.  In Alice’s case, she was subjected to crude and sexually suggestive
language and was touched inappropriately by Barry.  Based on this evidence,
it could easily be argued that Barry’s conduct toward Alice was because of
Alice’s sex, and as such, the “because of sex” requirement would be satisfied
and her claim could go forward, assuming all other requirements were met.
At this point, the court should then turn its attention to Andrew’s claim of
sexual harassment against Barry.  Similar to Alice, Andrew was subjected to
crude and sexually suggestive comments and was touched inappropriately as
well.  As a result of the evidence on the record, it would be reasonable to
conclude that Barry’s conduct toward Andrew was because of his sex and,
assuming all other requirements are satisfied, Andrew has a viable claim of
sexual harassment under Title VII.  This type of analysis allows courts to
reach the merits of individual claims in which victims present sufficient
evidence of sex-based conduct.102
The adoption of the individualized mode of analysis in dealing with cases
of equal opportunity harassers is the best approach from the standpoint of
fairness and justice.  While evidence of disparate treatment is necessary when
dealing with class-based discrimination, as illustrated above, sexual
harassment law does not fit neatly within traditional disparate-treatment
analysis.  Though an individual’s membership in a certain class is an
important factor, it is not determinative of who a harasser will target.  If and
when courts adopt this individualized approach, the goals underlying Title
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VII’s prohibitions against sexual harassment will be furthered.  If courts
continue to dismiss meritorious claims of sexual harassment based solely on
the presence of an equal opportunity harasser, victims of sexual harassment
will be left without protection and sexual harassment will continue unabated
into the future.
V.  REDEFINING “SEX” IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
As is well known, the term “sex” in Title VII was included primarily as
a last minute political effort by Southern Congressional members to create
opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.103  As a result, there is little
legislative history to provide the courts with any guidance on what exactly the
term “sex” was meant to encompass.104  Traditionally, under Title VII
analysis, many courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have used the terms
“sex” and “gender” synonymously and have concluded that “sex” applies only
to discrimination because of one’s biological distinction as a male or
female.105  While explaining the myriad of differences between “sex” and
“gender” is beyond the scope of this analysis, suffice it to say that the term
“sex” as used in Title VII sexual harassment claims has been limited to
traditional notions of what “sex” means (i.e., the biological distinction as
being male or female).  This limited view of “sex” has been used as
justification by a variety of courts to reject arguments put forth by
homosexuals, who contend that the term “sex” in Title VII includes sexual
orientation or sexual preference.106  When rejecting such arguments for an
extension of the term “sex,” many courts emphasize that, while there have
been proposed amendments, to prohibit discrimination under Title VII because
of sexual orientation, none have ever been enacted into law.107  However, a
narrow definition of “sex” as a biological classification differentiating men
and women limits the ability of Title VII to prohibit sexual harassment in the
workplace, most notably at the hands of an equal opportunity harasser.
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While it may be conceded that Congress had traditional notions of “sex”
in mind when it originally included the term “sex” in Title VII, Congress must
now provide a more expansive definition of this term in order to eliminate the
wide range of sexual harassment that exists throughout this country, as well
as to eliminate the use of the equal opportunity harasser defense.  As several
courts have emphasized, “If the term ‘sex’ as it is used in Title VII is to mean
more than biological male or biological female, the new definition must come
from Congress.”108  The remainder of this section will offer alternatives to the
current limited definition of “sex” as applied in hostile work environment
sexual harassment cases.  The more expansive definitions that are offered will
allow individuals who are sexually harassed by an equal opportunity harasser
to satisfy the “because of sex” requirement, which, under a strict
interpretation, is currently impossible to satisfy in cases involving equal
opportunity harassers.109
To begin, according to Steven Locke, the “because of sex” requirement,
which focuses judicial attention on determining the harasser’s motives, must
be replaced by an inquiry into the sexual nature of the harassing conduct.110
In essence, the current “because of sex” analysis is too limited because it
focuses primarily on the gender of the victim without understanding that all
sexual harassment is “rooted in sex-based conduct regardless of the parties’
gender or sexual orientation.”111  Any analysis of a hostile work environment
sexual harassment claim under Title VII must begin by determining if the
harassment in question is sex-based or non-sex-based.112  Courts and
commentators who suggest that an individual who harasses both men and
women cannot harass them both on the basis of sex fail to recognize this
important distinction.113  Locke provides a more expansive definition of “sex”
asserting:
Rather than asking if the plaintiff was harassed because of his or her sex, the court should
ask whether the vehicle of harassment was sex-based (i.e. was the harassment rooted in
sex, sexuality, sex roles, or sex stereotypes). . . . This factor, combined with an emphasis
on the harm suffered by the victim, will provide a test which properly focuses on the
conduct rather than the motive of the perpetrator.114
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Under this definition, “[w]hen a supervisor uses a sex-based medium to harass
both men and women employees, he is effectively harassing them because of
their sex. . . . This conduct should be prohibited by Title VII.”115  If this view
is adopted, Alice and Andrew from the third hypothetical above would most
likely have a Title VII claim against their supervisor even though he can be
characterized as an equal opportunity harasser.116  Locke applauded the
Chiapuzio court since it closely examined the sexual nature of the supervisor’s
harassing conduct instead of focusing on the traditional motive-based
“because of sex” analysis in finding that the supervisor violated Title VII.117
An analysis that focuses on the conduct of the harasser, as opposed to his
motives, appears to be consistent with the nature of discrimination laws, in
general, and sexual harassment law, in particular.  In essence, anti-
discrimination laws are meant to punish discriminatory behavior and not
discriminatory thoughts.118  As one commentator has suggested, “[w]hat
makes sexual harassment more offensive, more debilitating, and more
dehumanizing to its victims than other forms of discrimination is precisely the
fact that it is sexual.”119
Conversely, if the supervisor harasses both men and women using a non-
sex-based medium (e.g., he forces all employees to work long hours or gives
all employees difficult assignments), this is not harassment “because of sex,”
and as such, it is not actionable under Title VII.120  Based on Locke’s
definition, a supervisor who is simply rude and generally hostile in non-sexual
ways to all employees would not be guilty of sexual harassment because the
harasser would have harassed them regardless of their sex.  In the end, by
focusing on the sexual nature of the harasser’s conduct, the equal opportunity
harasser defense will be eliminated and the goals of preventing sexual
harassment and providing relief to those who have been harmed will be
furthered.121  As an aside, it could also be argued that, if Congress adopts
Locke’s definition of sex and eliminates the traditional but-for sex
requirement, Title VII will also provide protection for individuals who are
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sexually harassed because they are homosexual.122  Though the major
argument set forth in this note is for the elimination of the equal opportunity
harasser defense, if adoption of this definition not only eliminates the use of
that defense, but also provides homosexuals with protection from sexual
harassment, then this only provides additional justification for adoption of the
ideas set forth herein.  The goal of this note is to expand the protective
umbrella of Title VII to victims of equal opportunity harassers, but as the
cliché goes, if expanding the definition of sex “kills two birds with one stone,”
then serious consideration should be given to such a definition.
While not explicitly adopting Locke’s expansive definition of “sex,” the
Ninth Circuit in a plurality opinion in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.123
applied a much more liberal view of “sex” in order to hold that the plaintiff
had an actionable sexual harassment claim.  In this case, Rene, an openly
homosexual man, was subjected to offensive physical contact of a sexual
nature by several of his co-workers.124  In framing the issue to be decided, the
plurality stated, “[t]his case presents the question of whether an employee who
alleges that he was subjected to severe, pervasive, and unwelcome ‘physical
conduct of a sexual nature’” has a viable sexual harassment claim under Title
VII.125  In answering the question in the affirmative, the plurality stated, “It is
enough that the harasser have engaged in severe or pervasive unwelcome
physical conduct of a sexual nature.”126  Similar to Locke’s view, the plurality
focused its attention on the conduct of the harassers and not their motives
(which may have been because Rene was homosexual).127  Moreover, while
the facts of this case illustrate egregious behavior,128 in cases of less egregious
behavior, the judicial focus on the sexual conduct of the harasser would
provide plaintiffs with a viable claim in cases that would otherwise fail under
the traditional mode of analysis.  Though the Rene case did not involve an
equal opportunity harasser, it could be argued that if it did, as a result of the
court’s focus on the sexual conduct of the harassers, the plurality would still
allow Rene’s case to go forward.  Under Locke’s definition, this would be the
correct result.
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Similar to Rene, the Seventh Circuit in Doe v. City of Belleville129 took a
more liberal view of “sex” than traditionally applied.  In that case, the court
emphatically stated, “[W]e have difficulty imagining when harassment of this
kind [i.e., grabbing of testicles] would not be, in some measure, ‘because of’
the harassee’s sex . . . it would seem to us impossible to de-link the
harassment from the gender of the individual harassed.”130  If courts adopted
the more expansive view of “sex” advocated above, the equal opportunity
harasser defense would become inapplicable.  In the third hypothetical
outlined in the introduction, both of the plaintiffs would have a viable claim
against their equal opportunity harasser since his conduct against both victims
constituted “physical conduct of a sexual nature.”131
As Justice Scalia stated in Oncale, one way a plaintiff in a same-sex
sexual harassment case could bring an actionable claim is to show that the
harasser was motivated by sexual desire, so long as there is evidence that the
harasser was homosexual.132  It seems antithetical that a plaintiff can have a
viable Title VII claim against an individual if he could show that the harasser
was homosexual, but that the same plaintiff could not bring a Title VII sexual
harassment claim against the same harasser if it is shown that the harasser is
not homosexual, but bisexual.  Though the Court in Oncale did not accept
such an expansive definition of “sex” as is argued above, it may be difficult
for the Court to justify that evidence of sexual desire for victims of
homosexual harassers is relevant and vital to a Title VII claim but irrelevant
in the case of an equal opportunity harasser.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Since its inception in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII has
continued to evolve to deal with the always-changing area of employment
discrimination.  Though originally enacted to deal with the problems
associated with racial discrimination, Title VII now prohibits countless
behaviors in the workplace.  As such, Title VII must adapt once again to deal
with the recent phenomenon known as the equal opportunity harasser defense.
While some courts have accepted the equal opportunity harasser defense as a
means to escape liability under Title VII, other courts have resisted the
temptation to accept this defense to dismiss sexual harassment cases that come
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before them.  Acceptance of the equal opportunity harasser defense is an
impediment to the underlying goals and purposes of Title VII.  By allowing
the defense, courts are allowing, and it could be argued encouraging, such
behavior to continue while depriving victims of such conduct of any remedy
against the wrongdoer.  In order to avoid the consequences associated with the
equal opportunity harasser defense, courts must adopt an individualized mode
of analysis to determine if certain individuals are victims of sexual harassment
without considering the sexual harassment of others within the same work
environment.  It would be absurd to hold a supervisor liable for his continuous
sexual harassment of a female employee, but then to allow his behavior to go
unpunished merely because he subjects a male employee to the same
disgusting treatment.  Moreover, adopting a more expansive definition of
“sex” as set forth by Steven Locke would focus attention on the sexual nature
of the conduct in question as opposed to the motives of the sexual harasser.
Acceptance of this definition would not only eliminate the use of the equal
opportunity harasser defense but also support efforts to prohibit harassment
based on sexual orientation under Title VII as well.  In the end, the aspirations
and objectives underlying the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would
be furthered by adopting these proposals and thus allowing the dream of
equality to become more of a reality.
